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Vi l n i u s ,  L i t h u a n i a
Without doubt the gas conflict between Russia and 
Belarus was the event that captured our attention 
last month. It drew attention, it made headlines. 
However, this conflict seemed a bit fake. Possibly 
namely because it made headlines. Both sides could 
have quietly played the zero-sum money transfer 
game. It seemed as if both sides just wanted to test 
each others’ patience and arguments once again, 
to strengthen positions.   
Yet each such dispute is a mini battle for Belarusian 
energy security. Energy security, understood by 
Belarusian authorities as cheap energy, determines 
economic, political and even military security in 
Belarus and in the region. In this issue the percep-
tion of military security in the public opinion of 
Belarus is presented by Dzianis Melyantsou. In the 
future, it would be interesting to get familiarized 
with Belarusians’ attitudes towards other forms 
of security such as economic, energy and ecology. 
In these spheres the West, represented by the EU, 
would definitely be an attractive partner. 
Certainly, one can be a desirable partner in peo-
ple’s minds yet reality often limits the spheres of 
partnership. Belarus’ dependence on Russia at 
the moment is unchangeable. Experts claim that, 
although Belarus has not made the final decision to 
join the Custom Union, in the end it will become 
part of it since the access to the Russian market is at 
stake. The economic implications of accession to the 
Customs Union for Belarus are in detail presented 
in Irina Tochitskaya’s contribution. 
To be involved in a number of political and economic 
integration projects lead by Russia and at the same time 
to be so adversarial to Moscow is somewhat unique. 
Whether this uniqueness will be advantageous for 
Belarus and its people remains to be seen.
Julija Narkeviciute, Editor  
Dzianis Melyantsou, Belarusian 
Institute of Strategic Studies 
The Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies 
(BISS), in cooperation with the NOVAK research 
laboratory, has recently conducted a study of 
the public opinion in Belarus, focusing on se-
curity issues and Belarusians’ attitude towards 
military-political blocs. On the whole, the results 
of the study confirmed the low level of awareness 
of Belarusians about NATO and CSTO, as well 
as their poor interest in the military security 
issues.
Security Threats: What Are 
Belarusians Afraid Of?
19.8% of Belarusians believe, the military threat is 
real for their country. This is the evidence of the 
remains of the Soviet stereotypes confirmed by 
the direct link between positive answers on the 
presence of the external threat and respondents’ 
age. The feeling of external threat depends neither 
on sex, nor financial position of the respondents. 
However, it depends on their professional activ-
ity: the unemployed (66.7%), enterprises’ heads 
of divisions (33.3%), and personnel with higher or 
special secondary education (29.5%) have a stronger 
feeling of external threat. Among the sources of 
military threat they mostly mentioned NATO 
(6%), the USA (6.6%), the West in general (1.4%) 
and Russia (0.4%). 
According to the poll, the most anti-American 
category of the population are the unemployed 
(66.7%), the disabled (7.7%), and the housewives 
(2.2%), which might be a consequence of stronger 
(in comparison with the other categories) influence 
of the state propaganda broadcast on TV. 13.9% of 
the respondents think other countries have territo-
rial claims to Belarus. Among such countries they 
mostly mentioned Poland (6.4%), Russia (2.3%), 
and Lithuania (1.3%). Positive answers about the 
existence of territorial claims to Belarus are linked 
to the age of the respondents. 36.4% of the positive 
answers were given by the 45-64 age group. There is 
also a direct connection between the conviction of 
the presence of territorial claims and the financial 
welfare of the interviewees: 20% of respondents 
with high income, and only 1.4% of respondents 
with low income believe in the territorial ambi-
tions of Russia. 
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Attitudes Towards NATO
22% of the population believes that Belarus should 
develop its relations with NATO, while 10.6% sup-
port Belarus joining the Alliance. It is worthy of 
note that in both cases the percentage of DK/NA 
(Don’t know/No answer) is quite high: 27.9% and 
26% correspondingly. That might indicate insuf-
ficient awareness about NATO and its activity. At 
the same time, 43.4% of the respondents see NATO 
as a source of military threat if asked a close-ended 
question (with possible answers given), while only 
6% of the interviewees respond the same way if 
asked an open-ended question (with no possible 
answers given). This fact can be interpreted as a 
gradual (but still not final) “decay” of the “cold war” 
stereotypes about the Alliance. 
Cooperation with NATO is supported by 28.8% 
of the respondents aged between 18-24, and only 
16.8% of the respondents over 65. Support of coop-
eration with NATO depends even stronger on the 
financial situation of citizens. Thus, half of all high 
income respondents support cooperation with the 
Alliance, while only 17.2% citizens with low income 
are supporters of the cooperation. 
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Social profile of a supporter of Belarus’ membership 
in NATO: a young man under 35, winning income 
above the average, living in Brest or Minsk region 
and having an executive position at work. On the 
whole, this social profile corresponds with the profile 
of a pro-Western oriented Belarusian.
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71.9% of the respondents think it is necessary to 
keep the union with Russia and the CIS within 
the CSTO framework. 8.3% do not agree with this 
statement, which is somewhat less than the percent-
age of people supporting Belarus joining NATO. 
In other words, some respondents assume that 
Belarus can be member of both military-political 
blocs at the same time. 
On the whole, the profile of the pro-Russia and 
CSTO-oriented person is an antipode of the pro-
file of the NATO supporter. However, supporters 
of the union with Russia dominate in all age and 
social groups. 
Choice of security configuration depending on the age of respondents
 Belarus should develop cooperation with NATO
 Belarus should become member of NATO
 Belarus should keep the union with Russia and other CIS countries within CSTO
 Belarus should obtain the neutral status provided for in the Constitution, not join any military unions and terminate 
the existing memberships 
* AGE1 Crosstabulation
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Neutrality
25.2% of the respondents are convinced that 
Belarus should become a neutral state and leave 
the existing blocs. However, the opponents of the 
neutrality are 10% stronger, making up 35.8% of 
the population. Meanwhile, 39% did not make up 
their mind, which is the evidence of considerable 
inertia of mass consciousness and slow reaction to 
changes in the state propaganda. The attitude to 
neutrality almost does not depend on age and sex 
of the respondents, but depends on income level. 
Thus, the number of neutrality supporters among 
the people with high income is two times higher 
than among any other group, and makes up 50%. 
There were quite many undecided respondents in 
this group – 40% (while only 10% were against). 
Interestingly enough, 36.4% of respondents in 
this group earlier supported the idea of Belarus 
joining NATO, which is not compatible with the 
neutral status. 
Basic Conclusions:
High percentage of DK/NA answers demon-•	
strates poor interest of the population in military 
security issues, as well insufficient awareness 
of the issue. That is confirmed by the fact that 
among the undecided there are more citizens 
with lower income (they have other things to 
think about), while opinions are more polarized 
among the people with higher income. 
 On the whole, anti-Western moods in security •	
issues dominate in the country. However, the 
potential of constructing the public opinion 
remains high, as the significant percentage of 
the population did not make up their mind on 
the issue of geopolitical direction. 
We observe some inconsistency in answers: some •	
categories of respondents assume possibility of 
simultaneous membership of Belarus in differ-
ent military-political blocs, or simultaneous 
membership in one of the blocs and the neutral 
status of the country. 
The idea of Belarus’ neutrality is not supported •	
by the population. However, the sufficient per-
centage of the undecided leaves the window of 
opportunity for political forces aiming at the 
neutral status for Belarus wide open.  
Some respondents 
assume that Belarus 
can be member of 
both military-political 
blocs at the same 
time.
The potential of 
constructing the 
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Introduction: History Of Integration  
After break up of the USSR followed by economic 
disruption the CIS countries endeavored to main-
tain and restore the economic ties, to remain in 
traditional export markets, and to decrease the 
competitive pressure from the rest of the world using 
high external trade barriers. Therefore, in the first 
half of the 1990s a large number of regional trade 
agreements have been signed within the CIS. 
The CIS counties Free Trade Zone (FTZ) should 
be considered as the first attempt of trade coopera-
tion between Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
However, that agreement had not been ratified by 
Russia, which asked for exemptions from the FTZ 
(particularly on oil and gas), and therefore the Free 
Trade Zone did not come into force.  
In 1995 three countries - Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia - established a Customs Union that Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan agreed to join in 1996.1 In 
October 2000 the member countries decided to re-
organize it into the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EURASEC). The decision was ratified in May 2001. 
The countries intended to set a common external 
tariff (CET) on goods coming from the third coun-
tries (non-CIS) and to harmonize non-tariff barriers. 
Yet, the member states failed to reach the proclaimed 
goals. The reasons for that were diverse structure 
of the economies and different levels of economic 
development in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, and Tajikistan. Consequently, they failed 
to concur in their willingness to protect or open 
the economic sectors to international competition. 
Besides, Kyrgyzstan, being a WTO member since 
1990, conducts its trade policy in accordance with 
taken obligations, including the external tariff level. 
In addition, due to different reasons the countries 
have more and more reoriented their trade away 
from the regional trade agreements (RTA), leaning 
to excess of extra-regional trade over intra-regional 
for all member countries. As a result, the share of 
intra EURASEC exports shrank and amounted to 
9.5% in total export in 2008 whereas intra-bloc 
imports reduced to 18.5%.
1 Some other RTAs were created by CIS countries in the Central 
Asia and Caucuses (GUUAM, Central Asian Economic Union 
(CAEU), but since Belarus did not participate in those regional 
agreements we do not consider them in this paper.
Beyond the above mentioned agreements Russia 
and Belarus signed the Treaty on the Creation of 
a Union State in 1999. It provided for formation of 
the common economic space and monetary union, 
as well as establishment of supranational institu-
tions, i.e. the Supreme State Council, the Council of 
Ministers, and the Union Parliament. However, all 
of its economic undertakings remained on paper. 
Despite the dubious success of the previous regional 
trade initiatives within the CIS, in September 2003 
Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine concluded 
a draft agreement on the Single Economic Space 
(SES). The concept of SES was rather vague mainly 
due to position of Ukraine, which previously avoided 
participation in RTAs that presupposed creation of 
supranational bodies and went beyond free trade 
agreements. In addition, Ukraine introduced a 
provisional clause that SES must not contradict 
the Ukrainian Constitution and the strategic goal 
of integration into the EU. In the process of SES 
formation the countries had different positions 
and visions of the RTA. Thus, Russia and Belarus 
wanted to introduce a common currency and to 
form a customs union, while Ukraine insisted on a 
free trade zone without exceptions and limitations. 
These apparent contradictions have resulted in a 
failure of the SES regional initiative. 
New wave of regionalism within the CIS arose in 
2007 when EURASEC member states realized that 
it remained an incomplete free trade zone with 
trade discrimination problems (e.g. antidumping 
investigations), while the countries had not been able 
to settle their differences. Therefore, it was decided 
to implement regional integration initiatives within 
that RTA at diverse speed and different levels, i.e. 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia planed to set a CET 
and to create a customs union, while Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan would stay in a free trade zone. Alongside 
with that EURASEC has remained operational. 
In November 2009 the presidents of Belarus, Kaza-
khstan and Russia have reached an agreement on 
creation of a Customs Union since January 1, 2010, 
which presupposed not only formation of the com-
mon customs space from July 2010, but was to pave 
the way for deeper economic integration, namely 
the single economic space that is expected to be 
launched in January 2012. Such an extremely short 
term for creation of a single economic space is highly 
unlikely to prove realistic. From the experience of the 
EU, which at present is the only really functioning 
common economic space, it is evident that such a 
deep integration requires a lot of time and a high 
degree of coordination. The countries participating 
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in the Customs Union are unlikely in two years time 
to have reached an agreement on a wide range of 
highly sensitive issues, such as equally beneficial 
prices on natural resources, for instance. 
On November 27, 2009 the EURASEC Interstate 
Council (supreme body of the Customs Union) ap-
proved the Customs Code and a Common External 
Tariff (unified external duty rates). In addition it was 
announced that the countries would seek to join the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) simultaneously 
and form a single economic space in 2012. On March 
25, 2010 the Customs Union Commission of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia approved the mechanism 
of import customs duties distribution between the 
countries. According to the decision, Belarus will 
obtain 4.7% of the total sum of customs duties, 
Kazakhstan – 7.33%, and Russia – 87.97 %.2  
Undoubtedly, the fact that member countries 
managed to find a common position on the type 
of RTA, its functioning, possible supranational 
bodies, tariff regimes and introduction of CETs was 
an important step towards real integration of the 
three states. It should be mentioned that all efforts 
undertaken earlier did not bring desirable results, 
mostly due to the fact that member countries (apart 
from Belarus and Russia) were reluctant to unify 
their national tariff regimes. 
Yet, the haste accompanying the establishment of 
this regional trade agreement raised experts’ concern 
about its design and economic justification. It has to 
be mentioned that until the decision to creation the 
CU was undertaken, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan 
consistently reoriented their trade flows towards 
the rest of the world countries. For example, the 
share of the third countries in Belarusian exports 
increased from 34.14% to 67.1% during 1998-2008, 
while Russia’s share fell from 65.2% to 31.9%. Ka-
zakhstan’ share has not exceeded 1.1% during the 
period under consideration. The same trends are 
observed in Russia and Kazakhstan.
Therefore, many experts agree that one of the main 
reasons for Belarus to join EURASEC CU was the 
expectation that all trade barriers, including the 
oil export duties, would be abolished. However, 
Belarus and Russia did not succeed in reconciling 
the controversy concerning export tariffs on oil and 
finally Belarus applied to CIS Economic Court with 
the demand to ban Russian export duties as their 
imposition violates international legal documents 
signed between Russia and Belarus. In its turn, Rus-
sia insists on withdrawing the energy sector from 
integration, and, consequently, on exemption of oil 
products from the free trade regime until 2012, i.e. 
until the Common Economic Space is created.
Another sensitive issue for Belarus is the import 
tariffs on foreign automobiles for individuals. Ac-
cording to the signed agreement, customs duties for 
legal entities were increased from January 1, 2010; 
the tariffs for individuals should be harmonized with 
the Russian external tariffs on July 1, 2010. Yet, Rus-
2 http://www.tsouz.ru/KTS/meeting_2010_03_25/Pages/ 
R_199.aspx. 
sian import tariffs on used cars are 5-10 times higher 
than Belarusian ones and are virtually prohibitive. 
For example, according to the pre-CU import tariff, 
individuals in Belarus were to pay for a car with 
engine 2000 м3 produced in 2003 the amount of 
customs duty equal to 800 EUR, while according to 
the CU tariff rate the duty would be 8,000 EUR. For 
new cars the CU import tariff is also substantially 
higher than the national Belarusian tariff (30% of 
car value in comparison with 0.75 EUR per cubic 
meter of engine before CU). It is noteworthy that 
in 2008 the budget earnings from customs duties 
on cars approximately accounted for 25% of total 
budget earnings from customs duties, in 2009 this 
share increased to 33%. After introduction of the 
CET import of used cars to Belarus will be stopped, 
and, according to the estimation of the Belarusian 
Automobile Association, the number of imported 
new cars will go down by 3-4 times compared with 
2009. Accordingly budget revenues from customs 
duties on cars will be reduced by 7 times. Therefore, 
Belarus made a decision not to change duties on 
automobiles imported by individuals to Belarus 
from July 1, and framed it as an exemption from 
the common customs area. 
Due to the above mentioned fundamental disagree-
ment between Russia and Belarus, on May 28 only 
two countries, Russia and Kazakhstan, signed the 
Customs Code and other agreements related to the 
CU. They decided to launch the Customs Union 
from July 1. It has to be noted that the union will 
be launched with exceptions in many key product 
categories. And despite the fact that formally the 
Customs Union came into existence on January 1, 
2010, it will come into force only when the Customs 
Code is approved. Therefore, Belarus appears to be 
out of the first stage of the CU. Later the Belaru-
sian Minister of Economy announced that Belarus 
plans to rejoin the Customs Union with Russia and 
Kazakhstan and to ratify the Customs Code before 
July 1, 2010. The lower chamber of the Belarusian 
parliament received it for consideration on June 
8. Along with the Customs Code, it is planned to 
ratify the protocol on introducing amendments and 
additions to the agreement on the Customs Code. 
This Code has already been ratified by the Russian 
State Duma and Kazakhstan parliament in the end 
of May and on June 10 respectively. 
Later the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia 
Igor Shuvalov announced that the final decision on 
Belarus participation in the Customs Union would 
be made in Astana on July 5 during the meeting 
between the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia, held within the framework of the session of 
the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) 
Interstate Council. In his turn, Belarusian President 
Alexander Lukashenko stated on June 18 that Be-
larus would sign the documents on the Customs 
Union only if Russia immediately eliminated the 
duties on petroleum products and lifted the du-
ties on oil from January 1, 2011. However, many 
experts believe, Belarus will finally join the Customs 
Union as otherwise it will be at risk of losing the 
preferential access to the Russian market. 
Such an extremely 
short term for 
creation of a single 
economic space is 
highly unlikely to 
prove realistic.
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Bearing this in mind we are going to briefly exam-
ine the economic implications of possible Belarus’ 
membership in EURASEC-CU. 
Economic Implications For Belarus
Changes in tariffs and trade flows
The import tariffs unification before creation of 
the EURASEC Customs Union was at the level 
of 65%, herewith. Belarus and Russia harmonized 
95%, while Russia and Kazakhstan only 38% of the 
tariffs (as a consequence Kazakhstan will have to 
raise tariffs on more than 5,000 goods, therefore it is 
allowed to apply different tariffs than those agreed 
at the CET in 409 goods categories for a transition 
period that will last until 2015).3 The tariff regime of 
the new Customs Union is substantially based on 
Russian duties (92%). Therefore, according to Vice 
Prime Minister of Belarus Andrey Kobiakov, 74.6% 
of Belarusian tariff lines will be the same as before 
the EURASEC CU while tariffs on 18.7% goods 
will be increased, and on 6.7% - decreased. Bela-
rus preserves the system of authorized economic 
operators for alcohol products, tobacco goods, fish 
and seafood. These commodities can be imported 
to Belarus only by the so-called “special importers”. 
In addition, the countries adopted the list of 1,141 
sensitive goods, 632 of which are important for 
Belarus, tariffs on which will remain unchanged. 
The most considerable increase in customs duties is 
registered for the following commodity groups:  
Meat and edible meat offal (increase from 10 to •	
20 percentage points; however, for some specific 
goods within this group, e.g. ‘refrigerated pork’ 
the rates grew up to 50 percentage points); 
Sugars and sugar confectionery;•	
Aluminum and articles thereof (e.g. the increase •	
in external tariff in the commodity line ‘Twigs 
and sections from Aluminum’ reaches 100 
percentage points);
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (up •	
to 10 percentage points); 
Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling •	
stock (thus within a subgroup ‘Motor cars and 
other motor vehicles principally designed for the 
transport’ the external tariff has increased by 20 
percentage points (up to 30%) on a new vehicle, 
and by 500 percentage points on a second hand 
vehicle; within a subgroup ‘Motor vehicles for 
the transport of goods’ the customs duty has 
been raised on average by 15 percentage points 
on second-hand motor vehicles, and by 15-20 
percentage points on new ones. 
The following goods have experienced the reduc-
tion in external tariff: 
Iron and steel;•	
Machinery and mechanical appliances; parts •	
thereof; 
3  http://www.government.by/en/eng_dayevents20091204.
html.  
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts •	
thereof; sound recorders and reproducers (by 
10-20 percentage points); 
Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn •	
and woven fabric;
Headgear and parts thereof (by 5 - 10 percent-•	
age points); 
Photographic or cinematographic goods;•	
Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace, •	
tapestries; trimmings (by less than 5 percent-
age points).
The calculations based on changes of the weighted 
average tariff, the volume of imports from non-CIS 
countries and import demand elasticity show that 
introduction of the common external tariff will 
result in the reduction of imports from non-CIS 
countries which may reach 8% of the Belarusian 
non-CIS import in 2008. 
The increase in external tariff rates and reduction 
in imports for the commodity groups such as meat, 
products of the milling industry; malt, starches, 
sugars and sugar confectionery, textile articles is 
favorable for Belarusian producers, as it will help 
them to improve competitive positions both on 
Belarusian and Russian markets. 
The growth of customs duty for commodity group 
such as aluminum and its articles will result in di-
version of non-CIS imports and its replacement by 
Russian manufactures. The upward trend in tariffs 
on products of automobile industry (commodity 
group ‘Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling stock’) also correspond to Russia’s interest 
since Volvo and Daimler AG are opening truck 
assembling plants there, while Setra and Mercedes 
buses and coaches are already being assembled 
in Russia. The above mentioned plants together 
with Kamaz are expected to be the main rivals for 
Belarusian automotive industry products on the 
Russian market in the nearest future. 
Introduction of the CET will bring about the rise in 
non-CIS imports of some groups of commodities 
due to lowered customs duties. Primarily it applies 
to the following commodity groups: 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils; •	
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and its products;•	
Plastics and articles thereof;•	
Fur skins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof;•	
Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn •	
and woven fabric;
Man-made filaments;•	
Carpets and other textile floor coverings;•	
Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace, •	
tapestries; trimmings;
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories;•	
Footwear;•	
Machinery and mechanical appliances; parts •	
thereof;
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts •	
thereof; sound recorders;
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Optical, photographic, cinematographic, meas-•	
uring, checking, precision, medical or surgical 
instruments and apparatus; parts and acces-
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It should be noted that the decrease in tariffs on 
carpets, apparel, and footwear will make Belarusian 
companies less competitive in national and Russian 
market, as well as it may reduce Russian imports of 
the above mentioned goods. The growth of imports 
of the last three commodity groups which belong 
to the so-called investment goods, will promote 
technical upgrading of Belarusian enterprises, and 
should undoubtedly be treated  as a positive fact as 
it can result in the  improvement of competitiveness 
of their products in the future. 
Customs Union Membership 
And WTO Accession
After the creation of the Customs Union the mem-
ber countries announced their willingness to jointly 
enter the WTO. However, the rules and procedures 
of WTO accession do not provide for that. Moreo-
ver, Russia concluded bilateral negotiations with 60 
countries within the WTO working group. There 
are only a few unsettled questions on the way of 
Russia’s WTO accession, e.g. support of agriculture, 
export tariff rates on timber, and regulation of state 
companies’ activity. On the whole, it has moved well 
ahead of Kazakhstan and Belarus. Many experts 
associate Russia’s statement about its willingness 
to start WTO accession as a part of the Customs 
Union with its annoyance concerning protracted 
negotiations and the position of the USA. 
Being aware that joint WTO accession is unrealistic 
Russia announced that it will make the final decision 
on how to enter the Word Trade Organization (as a 
CU or separately) after evaluating its negotiations 
with the WTO in 2010. Moreover, according to 
some statements of Russian officials there is a high 
probability that Russia will manage to become a 
WTO member until the end of 2010. Therefore it 
is unlikely that participation in the EURASEC CU 
will allow Belarus to speed up the process of WTO 
accession. Сoordination of its position with Russia 
does not seem to be realistic either, since Russia made 
more progress on the way to WTO. In addition, the 
statement of the Belarusian MFA claiming Belarus 
is not going to accelerate negotiations for WTO ac-
cession is in disagreement with Russia’s willingness 
to enter this organization in the nearest future. As 
for coordination of the negotiation positions with 
Kazakhstan, it will be possible only on a narrow 
range of issues since the countries have rather dif-
ferent structures of national economies. 
Conclusions
After the introduction of a CET the level of tariff 
protection in Belarus has not changed noticeably. 
The simple average tariff decreased insignificantly, 
while weighted average tariff slightly grew up and 
accounted for 10.34%. Nevertheless, the calcula-
tion shows that as a result of the introduction of 
CET, the reduction in the volume of imports from 
non-CIS countries may reach 1.1 bn USD (8% of 
Belarusian non-CIS import in 2008). Yet, it will be 
mostly due to the stop of used cars import from 
non-member countries.  
Participation in the EURASEC CU can also strength-
en Belarus’ position as a transit country through less 
bureaucracy at the border with Russia.
However, it is unlikely that CU membership will 
bring about the FDI inflow in Belarus. Firstly, it 
was empirically proven that other factors such as 
liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization 
(e.g. comprehensive privatization program which 
opens several industries to foreign investment), 
property indices, legislative and regulatory envi-
ronment regulating foreign ownership rights are 
more important determinants for FDI inflows to 
countries like Belarus than regional integration. 
Secondly, in case of South-South RTAs (the type 
of EURASEC countries CU) the FDI usually goes 
to the bigger country, i.e. to the bigger market. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in the 
regional arrangement in question Russia will be 
the main beneficiary of FDI inflows.
It is unlikely that participation in the EURASEC CU 
will allow Belarus to speed up the process of WTO 
accession. Firstly, WTO rules and procedures do not 
provide for possibility to join it within a customs 
union. Secondly, coordination of Belarus’ position 
with Russia seems to be unrealistic since the latter 
made more progress on the way to WTO.
Finally, further implications of Belarus participa-
tion in the newly created regional trade agreement 
will highly depend on the common CU external 
and internal trade policy. Belarus membership 
at EURASEC CU can be considered as a positive 
element of the national trade policy only if the 
member countries constantly decrease the level 
of protectionism via reduction of Common Exter-
nal Tariff, decline non-tariff barriers, harmonize 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary norms, since all that 
may not only lead to increase in trade flows but 
also bring about a rise in consumer welfare and 
producer competitiveness.
However, Belarus 
and Russia did 
not succeed in 
reconciling the 
controversy 
concerning export 
tariffs on oil and 
finally Belarus 
applied to CIS 
Economic Court 
with the demand to 
ban Russian export 
duties. 
